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INTRODUCTION 
“Copyright could . . . stand upon no other founda-
tion, than natural justice and common law.”1 
                                                                                                                            
*  Senior Notes & Articles Editor, Fordham Intellectual Property, Media & Entertainment 
Law Journal, Volume XXVII; J.D. Candidate, Fordham University School of Law, 2017. 
1 Millar v. Taylor (1769) 98 Eng. Rep. 201, 207. 
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For decades lawyers, professors, philosophers, and law stu-
dents have been trapped in an endless, two-sided debate regarding 
the justification for copyright law in the United States. On one side 
stand the utilitarians, who argue that modern American copyright 
law amounts to nothing more than positive law2 in the form of an 
economic incentive for authors to express themselves creatively. 
Natural law theorists, on the other hand, argue that there is some-
thing more substantial behind the current copyright regime—that 
copyright is not merely a formulation of positive law, but a recogni-
tion of philosophical principles of ownership inherent in the natural 
order of the world. Discourse on this subject has resolved little, all 
the while exposing flaws for anti-copyright proponents to exploit 
along their path toward a complete[ly destructive] public domain. 
For this reason, copyright advocates desperately need a new 
theory—one that replaces the questionable reliance on John Locke 
but also incorporates the economic incentives argued for by the uti-
litarians. This Note attempts to start that process by rebuilding the 
understanding of copyright law from a teleological perspective. 
Part I outlines the arguments on both sides of the copyright law 
debate, including their weaknesses. Part II introduces an Aristote-
lian natural law theory, and Part III applies these principles to the 
U.S. Constitution. Part III also explores the consequences of think-
ing teleologically about the Copyright Clause of the Constitution. 
Finally, Part IV explains how this new perspective both aligns with 
current copyright jurisprudence and answers some of the field’s 
most vexing questions that are crucial amid a growing anti-
copyright movement. 
                                                                                                                            
2 The term “positive law,” as opposed to “natural law,” typically refers to human-
made legal structures that function as law principally because society recognizes them as 
law. See Positive Law, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014). In contrast, natural law 
is understood as law that reflects a greater, natural ordering inherent in the world. See id. 
at Natural Law. 
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I. THE CURRENT DEBATE 
A. The Utilitarian Argument 
The utilitarian argument begins where every philosophical 
analysis of copyright law should start. The Copyright Clause gives 
authors limited rights in their creative expressions “[t]o promote 
the Progress of Science.”3 These rights, William Patry argued in 
his copyright treatise, amount to nothing more than a “statutory 
tort, created by positive law for utilitarian purposes.”4 To Patry 
and his sympathizers, American copyright law is only meant to in-
centivize authors5 by distributing property rights among them to 
exploit for personal monetary gain.6 Without such an incentive, the 
continued creation of expressive works in the country would argu-
ably diminish.7 
The first objection to the utilitarian theory comes from many of 
the authors themselves; simply put, they do not do it for the mon-
ey.8 The argument that authors would lose the desire to express 
themselves creatively flatly ignores the millions of individuals who 
devote time and money to their creative outlets for little or no prof-
it. Artists who make a living off their work are few and far between, 
but artists nevertheless abound. 
                                                                                                                            
3 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
4 1 WILLIAM PATRY, PATRY ON COPYRIGHT § 1:1 (2016). 
5 Mary W.S. Wong, Toward an Alternative Normative Framework for Copyright: From 
Private Property to Human Rights, 26 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 775, 779–80 (2009) 
(“[The Copyright Clause] embodies the rationale that conferring limited property rights 
is the best means of achieving the broader public interest goal of knowledge advancement 
and societal development.”). But see EDUARDO MOISÉS PEÑALVER & SONIA K. KATYAL, 
PROPERTY OUTLAWS 39 (2010) (noting that the “utilitarian calculus reflects an asserted 
balance between the need to protect incentives for the creation of new information and 
the desire to protect access to a resource whose consumption is nonrivalrous”). 
6 Adam Moore & Ken Himma, Intellectual Property, STAN. ENCYCLOPEDIA PHIL. 
ARCHIVE § 3.2 (Sept. 22, 2014), http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2014/entries/ 
intellectual-property/ [https://perma.cc/64CN-F9ZM] (“Thus control is granted to 
authors and inventors of intellectual property, because granting such control provides 
incentives necessary for social progress.”). 
7 See PATRY, supra note 4, § 1:1. 
8 For example, Walt Disney’s personal mantra was: “I don’t make movies to make 
money—I make money to make movies.” Walt Disney and Brad Bird on Why They Want 
to Make Money, BOB SUTTON: WORK MATTERS (Mar. 6, 2014), http://bobsutton. 
typepad.com/my_weblog/2014/03/walt-disney-and-brad-bird-on-why-they-want-to-
make-money-1.html [https://perma.cc/HE34-Z8L4]. 
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One of the more fundamental objections to the utilitarian 
theory of copyright is a rejection of its reliance on economics. Eco-
nomic theories of law have faced heavy criticism, despite their re-
cent popularity, both generally and in the context of copyright law.9 
Political philosopher Michael Sandel outlined two such objections 
in his book Justice: What’s the Right Thing to Do: “First, [the utili-
tarian approach] makes justice and rights a matter of calculation, 
not principle. Second, by trying to translate all human goods into a 
single, uniform measure of value, it flattens them, and takes no ac-
count of the qualitative differences among them.”10 
Sandel’s second objection is particularly relevant, considering 
that the three major areas of intellectual property law—copyright, 
trademark, and patent law (all with their own separate underlying 
rationales and utilities)—are often flattened together under the 
umbrella of “intellectual property.”11 The differences between 
them are frequently ignored.12 The fact that these important dis-
tinctions are consistently overlooked by utilitarians suggests, as 
                                                                                                                            
9 See, e.g., MICHAEL J. SANDEL, JUSTICE: WHAT’S THE RIGHT THING TO DO? 260–61 
(2009); James Gordley, The Moral Foundations of Private Law, 47 AM. J. JURIS. 1, 5 (2002) 
(“From the economist’s standpoint, a distribution of purchasing power is not efficient or 
inefficient or just or unjust. Consequently, in and of itself, nothing bad can have happened 
if the distribution of purchasing power between two individuals changes. That cannot be 
the evil the law seeks to remedy. For an economist, the evil must be that unless relief is 
given, someone will incur some unnecessary cost.”); Justin Hughes, The Philosophy of 
Intellectual Property, 77 GEO. L.J. 287, 299 (1988); Katie Sykes, Toward a Public 
Justification of Copyright, 61 U.T. FAC. L. REV. 1, 23 (2003); Wong, supra note 5, at 780 
(“‘Incentive theory’ and a wholly economic analysis of copyright law do not fully explain 
all the principles that form part and parcel of modern copyright law, and do not easily 
accommodate the influence of other theories, such as the natural rights theory . . . .”). 
10 SANDEL, supra note 9, at 260. 
11 See, e.g., Moore & Himma, supra note 6, § 2. See generally Rufus C. King, The 
“Moral Rights” of Creators of Intellectual Property, 9 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 267 
(1991). 
12 See infra Section III.B. The Supreme Court often refers to the “useful arts” and—a 
term meant for the patent context—in the context of copyright. See, e.g., Cariou v. Prince, 
714 F.3d 694, 705 (2013); Fogerty v. Fantasy, Inc., 510 U.S. 517, 526 (1994); Feist 
Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., Inc., 499 U.S. 340, 349 (1991); Harper & Row 
Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 546 (1985) (improperly referring 
“inventors,” in addition to the “useful arts,” in the copyright context). 
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others have, that the utilitarian theory is not concerned with justice 
at all, but only with efficiency.13 
Even if the merit in the economic perspective is assumed, the 
incentive argument does not align with the current copyright 
framework.14 Arguments for the efficiency of an incentivization 
scheme in copyright law do little to explain why artistic endeavor 
should be encouraged in the first place.15 More importantly, any 
incentive facilitated by the current copyright regime ought to be an 
incentive to share, not merely to create.16 Countless scholars have 
explicitly stated that U.S. copyright law persists to incentivize crea-
tion.17 However, any author is free to stubbornly sit on her crea-
tions and refuse to share her insights with the public. If she does sit 
on them, copyright laws may be of no use to her. The focus should 
therefore be on sharing, and not on creating. The utilitarians, busy 
with their calculations, have largely overlooked this important dis-
tinction. Those who recognize the importance of sharing creative 
expressions, not just making them, argue that the incentives pro-
vided by U.S. copyright law ensure that more and more informa-
tion is added to the public library.18 Nevertheless, this argument 
misses a fundamental problem exposed by Professor Justin Hughes 
                                                                                                                            
13 James Gordley, The Moral Foundations of Private Law, 47 AM. J. JURIS. 1, 5 (2002) 
(“Those who try to explain the law in terms of economics do not concern themselves 
with justice but with efficiency.”). 
14 Wong, supra note 5, at 780 (“‘Incentive theory’ and a wholly economic analysis of 
copyright law do not fully explain all the principles that form part and parcel of modern 
copyright law, and do not easily accommodate the influence of other theories, such as the 
natural rights theory . . . .”). 
15 See Rufus C. King, The “Moral Rights” of Creators of Intellectual Property, 9 CARDOZO 
ARTS & ENT. L.J. 267, 271 (1991) (“To say that the legal right to prevent others from 
exploiting one’s intellectual property is an ‘economic right’ does not mean that it is not 
also a moral right.”). 
16 Cf. Gary Kauffman, Exposing the Suspicious Foundation of Society’s Primacy in 
Copyright Law: Five Accidents, 10 COLUM.-VLA J.L. & ARTS 381, 383–84 (1985) 
(discussing the differences in a copyright system that promotes “production” and one 
that promotes “access”). 
17 See, e.g., Kauffman, supra note 16, at 383 (“A copyright serves as an incentive; it 
fosters creation.”); Pierre N. Leval, Toward a Fair Use Standard, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1105, 
1109 (1990) (“Monopoly protection of intellectual property that impeded referential 
analysis and the development of new ideas out of old would strangle the creative 
process.”). 
18 See, e.g., Kauffman, supra note 16, at 384 (“Society must have access to literature, of 
course, to gain the benefit of increased production.”). 
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in his seminal article on copyright philosophy: “If the new wealth 
remains the private property of the laborer, it does not increase the 
common stock.”19 
The utilitarian’s incentive argument is further weakened by the 
copious social and legal restraints on copyright owners.20 If the re-
ward for artistic creation is the right to exploit her work for finan-
cial gain, why is that right undercut by fair use jurisprudence, the 
first sale doctrine, and term limits, among others? What incentive 
is there for photographer Patrick Cariou to continue crafting his art 
if courts are simply going to allow appropriation artist Richard 
Prince to make the slightest of changes and sell the same prints for 
an exponentially higher profit?21 What reason do textbook publish-
ers have to continue investing in education materials under the rul-
ing in Kirtsaeng v. John Wiley & Sons?22 Furthermore, if incentivi-
zation is the only impetus for copyright law, then rights in intangi-
ble property ought to protect works forever, just as rights in real 
property do.23 
Most damaging to the utilitarian argument is the existence of 
moral rights in both U.S. and international copyright law. Calling 
them “moral rights” single-handedly suggests that more than mere 
calculations toward efficiency justify copyright.24 For example, the 
Visual Artists Rights Act (“VARA”) gives authors a right of attri-
bution by which they can demand recognition as the work’s origi-
nal author even after the work and its underlying copyright have 
been sold.25 The right of attribution has little, if anything, to do 
with exploiting the right for financial gain. After the sale, the au-
thor who exercises her moral rights has already received her re-
                                                                                                                            
19 Justin Hughes, supra note 9, at 299. 
20 See PEÑALVER & KATYAL, supra note 5, at 39, 41. 
21 See infra Section IV.B. for a discussion of Cariou v. Prince, 714 F.3d 694 (2d Cir. 
2013). 
22 See infra Section IV.C. for a discussion of Kirtsaeng v. John Wiley & Sons, 133 S. Ct. 
1351 (2013). 
23 There is some disagreement as to whether copyright and other forms of intellectual 
property confer “property” rights on their owners. See infra Section III.B. 
24 See Alfred C. Yen, Restoring the Natural Law: Copyright as Labor and Possession, 51 
OHIO ST. L.J. 517, 520 (1990) (arguing that frequent decisions in controversial copyright 
cases often make no mention of economic considerations which suggests that “something 
besides economics influences copyright decisions”). 
25 17 U.S.C. § 106A (2012). 
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ward. In fact, monetary remedies are prohibited when recovering 
under the right of attribution; the only recourse available remains 
an injunction.26 Either utilitarianism does not account for the enti-
rety of the copyright regime or moral rights are unjustified under a 
framework built strictly to incentivize. 
B. The Lockean Argument 
John Locke’s explanation of traditional property rights has be-
come the classical argument for the justification of intellectual 
property rights in the United States.27 His theory for property 
ownership begins with an individual’s body.28 When a man mixes 
his labor with the natural world, the argument goes, his labor “adds 
value to the goods, if in no other way than by allowing them to be 
enjoyed by a human being.”29 Through this process, man comes to 
own the commonly held natural goods upon which he expends his 
energy.30 
In truth, the Lockean argument seems overly fantastical. As Je-
remy Waldon points out, “the idea of mixing one’s labor is incohe-
rent—actions cannot be mixed with objects.”31 That is not to say 
that metaphysics has no place in legal philosophy. Rather, the prob-
lem is that Locke’s argument is a decidedly physical one.32 Locke 
meant to justify real property, not intangible property. Any possi-
                                                                                                                            
26 See Mass. Museum of Contemporary Art Found., Inc. v. Buchel, 593 F.3d 38, 55–56 
(1st Cir. 2010). Similarly, plaintiffs suing under the right of integrity typically only receive 
injunctions if the work is one of “recognized stature.” Id. at 53 n.13. Even in instances 
where damages are awarded, they are done so in order to make whole the author’s 
damaged reputation, not to recapture profits lost from a stolen opportunity to exploit the 
work. See § 106A(a)(2) (specifying that moral rights are available to prevent damage to 
the author’s “honor or reputation”). 
27 See King, supra note 15, at 284; see also PATRY, supra note 4, § 1:1. 
28 King, supra note 15, at 285. 
29 Hughes, supra note 9, at 297; see also King, supra note 15, at 284; Moore & Himma, 
supra note 6, § 3.3 (“When an individual labors on an unowned object, her labor becomes 
infused in the object and for the most part, the labor and the object cannot be 
separated.”). 
30 See Moore & Himma, supra note 6, § 3.3 (“The intuition is that the person who 
clears unowned land, cultivates crops, builds a house, or creates a new invention obtains 
property rights by engaging in these activities.”). 
31 Id. § 3.3.1. 
32 See Lior Zemer, The Making of a New Copyright Lockean, 29 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 
891, 896 (2006). 
620          FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. [Vol. XXVII:613 
 
bility that he intended to apply labor theory to copyright law or 
other forms of intangible property is foreclosed by what he said 
about authors.33 Real property, unlike its intellectual counterpart, 
can be physically possessed, the implications of which ought not to 
be ignored in an attempt to understand the rationale for private in-
tellectual property rights. And, as at least one commentator has 
pointed out, the codification of copyright law into positive statute 
arose out of the difficulty of applying common law to items “un-
possessable as a matter of natural law.”34 The nail in the coffin is 
hammered home by the fact that Locke tasked himself with justify-
ing the distribution of limited resources in order to avoid a tragedy 
of the commons.35 In the realm of creative expression, resources 
are not limited in the same way,36 so there is no need to construct a 
theory that avoids such a problem.37 
As with the utilitarian argument, the Lockean argument too has 
trouble aligning itself with modern American copyright law. Sym-
pathizers argue that copyright protection is granted as a result of 
the value created by an individual’s mixture of labor and land.38 But 
this does not explain why even valueless works are given copyright 
protection.39 Hundreds, perhaps thousands, of original works of 
authorship are created every year and never purchased by anyone. 
                                                                                                                            
33 See id. at 896, 898–905. 
34 Yen, supra note 24, at 551. 
35 See Jeremy Waldron, Property and Ownerhip, STAN. ENCYCLOPEDIA PHIL. § 5 (Sept. 
6, 2004), https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/property/ [https://perma.cc/GV5J-NGZR] 
(outlining perspectives on the Tragedy of the Commons, including Locke’s conclusion 
that even the laborer who owns no private property benefits from a privatized economy). 
36 Robert Cunningham, The Tragedy of (Ignoring) the Information Semicommons: A 
Cultural Environmental Perspective, 4 AKRON INTELL. PROP. J. 1, 19 (2010) (“The unique 
nature of information means that there is no need to allocate its use since there is no 
danger of a ‘tragedy of the commons’ as the information commons simply cannot be 
overgrazed.”); see also PEÑALVER & KATYAL, supra note 5, at 38 (noting that because 
there is no risk of over-distributing an idea, “more than one individual can share a single 
good simultaneously with others, and with no danger of depriving anyone else”). 
37 Cunningham, supra note 36, at 26 (“Given [that information is not a scarce 
resource], the legal structures and policy discourse that surround information should also 
be different.”). 
38 Hughes, supra note 9, at 297; see also King, supra note 15, at 284; Moore & Himma, 
supra note 6, § 3.3 (“When an individual labors on an unowned object, her labor becomes 
infused in the object and for the most part, the labor and the object cannot be 
separated.”). 
39 Hughes, supra note 9, at 309; see Yen, supra note 24, at 520. 
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Under a Lockean theory, such works would be afforded no protec-
tion. Never mind that assessing the value of a creative work is wild-
ly subjective; it is not the province of the law to pass judgment on 
artistic merit.40 
The labor theory of copyright would logically entail that effort 
always creates property. Current copyright jurisprudence, howev-
er, does not embrace that conclusion. Two basic requirements of 
the Copyright Act of 1976 dispel the idea that labor alone creates 
property. First, works must be “original” in order to earn the sta-
tute’s protection.41 In short, the Act demands that creative works 
display a “modicum of creativity” in order to earn its protection.42 
Generic expressions of naturally existing items earn no protection, 
no matter the amount of effort invested in the expression’s devel-
opment. Lockeans suffered a serious blow in this regard in Feist 
Publications, Inc. v. Rural Telephone Service Co., where the originali-
ty requirement flexed its muscles.43 The Supreme Court explicitly 
rejected the “sweat of the brow” argument presented by the plain-
tiff, the manufacturer of a phone book copied by a competitor.44 
The Court described sweat of the brow as a combination of labor 
and “public domain materials,” a description dangerously similar 
to Locke’s labor theory.45 Copyright protection on the basis of 
sweat of the brow alone, the Court held, “distorts basic copyright 
                                                                                                                            
40 See, e.g., Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co., 188 U.S. 239, 251–52 (1903) (“It 
would be a dangerous undertaking for persons trained only to the law to constitute 
themselves final judges of the worth of pictorial illustrations, outside of the narrowest and 
most obvious limits. At the one extreme, some works of genius would be sure to miss 
appreciation . . . . At the other end, copyright would be denied to pictures which appealed 
to a public less educated than the judge.”). 
41 17 U.S.C. § 102 (2012) (“Copyright protection subsists, in accordance with this title, 
in original works of authorship fixed in any tangible medium of expression . . . .”). 
42 Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., Inc., 499 U.S. 340, 346 (1991). 
43 See id. 
44 Id. at 359–60 (“In summary, the 1976 revisions to the Copyright Act leave no doubt 
that originality, not ‘sweat of the brow,’ is the touchstone of copyright protection in 
directories and other fact-based works. Nor is there any doubt that the same was true 
under the 1909 Act.”). 
45 Id. at 354; see also id. at 352–53 (citing Jeweler’s Circular Pub. Co. v. Keystone Pub. 
Co., 281 F. 83, 88 (1922)). 
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principles . . . without the necessary justification of protecting and 
encouraging the creation of ‘writings’ by ‘authors.’”46 
Second, the Copyright Act also requires works to be sufficiently 
fixed in a “tangible medium of expression.”47 For example, a song 
existing only in the mind of a musician earns no copyright protec-
tion until it is recorded or written down, no matter how many 
hours the musician spent crafting it in his head.48 The finding that 
the fruits of the mind receive no protection has been settled law for 
more than 130 years. The Supreme Court articulated the rationale 
for the idea/expression dichotomy, which is now codified in federal 
law,49 in the 1879 case Baker v. Selden.50 The plaintiff’s book de-
scribing a method of accounting enjoyed no copyright protection, 
the Court concluded, because “[w]here the truths of a science or 
the methods of an art are the common property of the whole world, 
any author has the right to express the one, or explain and use the 
other, in his own way.”51 Mixing labor with “common property,” 
the Court seems to have said, is not enough on its own to create a 
property right.52 
Even these two most basic elements of modern copyright law, 
originality and the idea/expression dichotomy, cannot make room 
for Locke. Nevertheless, natural law theorists continue to cling to 
Locke as if he is at the helm of a lifeboat.53 But the death of Locke’s 
                                                                                                                            
46 Id. at 354 (quoting 1-3 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON 
COPYRIGHT § 3.04 (1990)). 
47 17 U.S.C. § 102 (2012) (“Copyright protection subsists, in accordance with this title, 
in original works of authorship fixed in any tangible medium of expression, now known or 
later developed, from which they can be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise 
communicated, either directly or with the aid of a machine or device.”). 
48 See id. 
49 Id. (“In no case does copyright protection for an original work of authorship extend 
to any idea, procedure, process, system, method of operation, concept, principle, or 
discovery, regardless of the form in which it is described, explained, illustrated, or 
embodied in such work.”). 
50 101 U.S. 99 (1879). 
51 Id. at 100–01. 
52 See id. 
53 Some scholars have advocated for a third, personality-based theory that relies on the 
philosophy of Martin Heidegger. See generally Hughes, supra note 9. But this theory, too, 
suffers from similar problems, and Hughes has argued that it only makes sense when 
combined with Locke’s labor theory. Id. at 329. It is an interesting theory, but it suffers 
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labor theory does not preclude a natural justification for the Ameri-
can copyright framework. Of all the natural law philosophers, 
Locke is but one. The idea that America’s Founding Fathers were 
influenced by no other natural law philosophers is unsupported. 
The remainder of this Note therefore attempts to find a new natu-
ral copyright law. This time, the man at the helm of the lifeboat is 
one whose ideas have endured much longer than, and may have 
even influenced, Locke.54 He is the man Thomas Aquinas (“The 
Naturalist”) referred to as The Philosopher, and whom many con-
sider one of the original sources of natural law: Aristotle.55 
II. ARISTOTLE’S TELEOLOGY 
A. Introduction to Teleology 
Justice in the eyes of Aristotle meant treating equals equally and 
unequals unequally.56 In other words, it meant giving each person 
his due.57 But how does one determine what each person is due? As 
Sandel explains, it depends on what is being distributed.58 Aris-
totle’s famous example asked a simple question: Who should play 
the best flutes?59 The best flute players, of course.60 Sandel ex-
plained: 
Justice discriminates according to merit, according 
to the relevant excellence. And in the case of flute 
playing, the relevant merit is the ability to play well. 
It would be unjust to discriminate on any other ba-
                                                                                                                            
from the same fantastical problems as Locke’s theory. Furthermore, it does not answer 
the question of why legal imprimatur ought to be given to embodiments of personality. 
54 See SUSAN FORD WILTSHIRE, GREECE, ROME AND THE BILL OF RIGHTS 12–13 (1992) 
(noting that Locke referred to Aristotle’s focus on the rational “exercise of the mind” as 
the “special capacity of human beings”). 
55 Id. at 13. 
56 ANTHONY WALSH & CRAIG HEMMENS, LAW, JUSTICE, AND SOCIETY 29 (4th ed. 
2016). 
57 See TONY BURNS, ARISTOTLE AND NATURAL LAW 91 (2011). 
58 SANDEL, supra note 9, at 187. 
59 Id. 
60 Id. 
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sis, such as wealth, or nobility of birth, or physical 
beauty, or chance (a lottery).61 
The conclusion that the best flute players should play the best 
flutes is derived through teleological thinking. In order to deter-
mine each individual’s rights in social institutions one must first 
uncover the “purpose, end, or essential nature” of the issue at 
hand.62 Aristotle referred to the purpose, end, or essential nature of 
a thing as its telos.63 Thinking teleologically, therefore, allows one 
to consider the true nature of a thing—a practice, a custom, or an 
institution—in order to craft laws that best fulfill that practice, cus-
tom, or institution’s purpose.64 
Teleological thinking in modern times is not uncommon, even 
in the law.65 A recent movement for the reinstitution of Aristotle in 
contemporary law argued that “the final end of law is to promote 
human flourishing—to enable humans to lead excellent lives.”66 
Such an aretaic theory—named after the Greek word for excel-
lence, arête—puts virtue and teleology back at the center of law.67 
Instead of defending modern legislative proposals on economic 
bases alone, an aretaic theory of law harmonizes efficiency and nat-
ural law by harnessing economic arguments as a means for con-
structing laws aimed at achieving the natural telos of a given regula-
tory framework.68 The realm of private law in particular, which to-
day includes copyright law, is better understood by an Aristotelian 
approach.69 Instead of constructing property rights from outside 
                                                                                                                            
61 Id. 
62 Id. at 186. 
63 Id. at 188. 
64 THOMAS AQUINAS, ON LAW, MORALITY, AND POLITICS xix (William P. Baumgarth & 
Richard J. Regan eds., Richard J. Regan trans., Hackett Publ’g Co., 2d ed. 2002) (“The 
central theme of Aristotle’s metaphysics is that the natures of things determine their type 
of activity, and, conversely, that their specific type of activity indicates the things’ 
natures.”). 
65 See ERNEST J. WEINRIB, THE IDEA OF PRIVATE LAW 3 (Oxford Univ. Press rev. ed. 
2012) (“That one comprehends law through its goals . . . is particularly well entrenched in 
American legal scholarship.”). 
66 VIRTUE JURISPRUDENCE 2 (Colin Farrelly & Lawrence B. Solum eds., 2007). 
67 Id. at 3. 
68 See Gordley, supra note 13, at 2 (“Private law is better explained by the concepts 
central to the [Aristotelian tradition] such as preference satisfaction and economic 
efficiency as the economists understand them.”). 
69 Id. 
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the social system, and then applying them to society and its posi-
tive laws as Locke sought to do,70 Aristotle’s property theory in-
tertwines positive laws with the natural world and its aim for hu-
man flourishing in society.71 
B. Distributive Justice 
Determining what each person is due is a matter of what Aris-
totle called “distributive justice.”72 It is in this context that he dis-
agreed with Plato over how to distribute private property: Plato ar-
gued that society is best served when property is held in common 
so that all individuals can contribute to it and reap its benefits.73 
Aristotle pointed out that social progress is better achieved through 
private ownership.74 After all, property held in common is often the 
least cared for.75 Without private ownership, no one would have an 
incentive to work, improve, and care for their property.76 The pub-
lic benefits from resources cultivated by private citizens.77 Human 
flourishing, Aristotle argued, is therefore achieved by giving each 
individual a personal stake in the success of the whole group.78 
It may be easy to assume that Aristotle intended to distribute all 
things equally—that is, that all persons should receive the same 
distributions. This is not the case. Distributive justice is not equal 
                                                                                                                            
70 See WALSH & HEMMENS, supra note 56, at 14–15 (stating that Locke’s labor theory 
“logically preceded an established political system”); King, supra note 15, at 285. 
71 See WEINRIB, supra note 65, at 4 (“The goal-oriented understanding of private law 
follows from the seemingly axiomatic proposition that the object of the law is to serve 
human needs.”). 
72 WALSH & HEMMENS, supra note 56, at 29–30 (“Distributive justice relates to how a 
political entity such as a nation-state distributes resources to its members.”). 
73 See Waldron, supra note 35, § 2 (“Plato . . . argued that collective ownership was 
necessary to promote common pursuit of the common interest, and to avoid the social 
divisiveness that would occur ‘when some grieve exceedingly and others rejoice at the 
same happenings.’” (citing PLATO, REPUBLIC, bk. V, § 462b (C.D.C. Reeve ed., G.M.A. 
Grube trans., Hackett Publ’g Co. 2d ed. 1992) (c. 380 B.C.E.))). 
74 Id. (“Aristotle responded by arguing that private ownership promotes virtues like 
prudence and responsibility: ‘[W]hen everyone has a distinct interest, men will not 
complain of one another, and they will make more progress, because every one will be 
attending to his own business.’” (quoting ARISTOTLE, POLITICS, bk. II, § 1263a (C.D.C. 
Reeve trans. Hackett Publ’g Co. 1998) (c. 350 B.C.E.))). 
75 See Cunningham, supra note 36, at 20. 
76 See Gordley, supra note 13, at 3. 
77 See id. 
78 See Waldron, supra note 35, § 2. 
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in amount, but equal in proportion according to what each individ-
ual deserves.79 For example, “[t]wo people may have identical 
needs, but one of them may deserve a much greater proportion be-
cause of his or her contributions to the community.”80 
On this bedrock of teleology and distributive justice, the next 
Part considers the natural telos of American copyright law and its 
implications for the positive laws that were crafted for it even be-
fore the birth of the nation. 
III. REBUILDING COPYRIGHT 
A. Copyright Teleology 
It is one thing to argue for a legislative framework based on te-
leological thinking. It is another to put that into practice. In particu-
lar, the question here asks for the telos or purpose U.S. copyright 
law is meant to serve. Fortunately, the Constitution’s framers 
largely answered this question: “To promote the Progress of 
Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors 
and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and 
Discoveries.”81 
The telos here is clear: Copyright laws aim to “promote the 
progress of Science.”82 The term “Science” in 1789 carried a 
slightly different meaning than it does today. It was not meant to 
refer to science in the literal sense, but rather simply as the general 
advancement of knowledge.83 For the sake of clarity, this Note re-
fers to the progress of Science as the progress of knowledge. 
It is worth pointing out that the terms “Science” and “useful 
Arts” in the Copyright Clause carry two entirely distinct meanings. 
Science is meant to be governed by the copyright regime, and use-
ful Arts by the patent regime.84 A quick glance at the structure of 
                                                                                                                            
79 WEINRIB, supra note 65, at 62, 66. 
80 WALSH & HEMMENS, supra note 56, at 30. 
81 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
82 Id. 
83 Giles Sutherland Rich, The “Exclusive Right” Since Aristotle, 14 FED. CIR. B.J. 217, 
224 (2004). 
84 Id. 
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the Copyright Clause reveals its symmetry: The “Progress of 
Science” is carried out by “Authors” through their “Writings,” 
and the “Progress of useful Arts” by “Inventors” through their 
“Discoveries.”85 
This is an important point for understanding how copyright 
laws should be construed. As discussed, the copyright framework is 
meant to foster the advancement of knowledge, not utility. Unfor-
tunately, this distinction between knowledge and utility has gone 
overlooked throughout the years, even by the Supreme Court.86 
And, as several scholars have pointed out, these and others of the 
courts’ mistakes have contributed to a significant misunderstand-
ing of copyright in general and, more importantly here, in its appli-
cation toward the directive it serves.87 To be clear, no discussion of 
copyright, whether in law review articles, courts, or on the floor of 
Congress should include the words “useful Arts,” “Inventors,” or 
“Discoveries.” Copyright law is not a tool for increasing utility. 
That directive and the above terms are served by the patent re-
gime. 
Returning to the telos of copyright law, the advancement of 
knowledge may seem like an unfulfilling answer on its own. For 
what purpose? Surely the framers thought greater understanding to 
be important to society in general. To Aristotle, the advancement 
of knowledge is crucial for human flourishing.88 Virtue of thought, 
together with virtue of character, leads to wisdom, without which 
“one cannot determine right action.”89 It is virtuous thought, the 
progress of knowledge, Aristotle said, that facilitates human flou-
rishing.90 
It is quite possible that the framers of the Constitution meant to 
promote the advancement of knowledge for its own sake. However, 
the language the framers used, together with the history of natural 
philosophy that influenced them, both support the argument that 
                                                                                                                            
85 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
86 See cases cited supra note 12. 
87 See generally Kauffman, supra note 16. 
88 See Chapin F. Cimino, Private Law, Public Consequences, and Virtue Jurisprudence, 71 
U. PITT. L. REV. 279, 285 (2009). 
89 Id. 
90 See id. 
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the framers intended the Constitution to function as a means for 
the advancement of an Aristotelian concept of human flourishing.91 
Both the Declaration of Independence and the Constitution are 
replete with ambitious language aimed at creating a prosperous and 
propitious society. The Declaration of Independence, for example, 
considered separation from Great Britain to be necessary under the 
“Laws of Nature” in order to build a new government “most likely 
to effect [the People’s] Safety and Happiness.”92 Likewise, the 
preamble to the Constitution, penned thirteen years later, stressed 
the desire to form a “perfect Union,” to “establish Justice,” and 
to promote the “general Welfare” of the country’s citizens.93 The 
framers’ inclusion of copyright protection in the foundation of the 
government should be viewed as neither accident nor convenience; 
its own aim rightly points in the direction of the even higher goal of 
promoting human flourishing.94 
In her book Greece, Rome, and the Bill of Rights, Professor Susan 
Ford Wiltshire traced these ideas back to Ancient Greece, and to 
Aristotle in particular.95 These natural law principles expressed by 
the framers, Wiltshire argued, reflect their search for human flou-
rishing.96 Justice Louis Brandeis also recognized the framers’ in-
tentions in his concurring opinion in the 1927 case Whitney v. Cali-
fornia: 
Those who won our independence believed that the 
final end of the state was to make men free to develop 
                                                                                                                            
91 See id. at 281 (arguing that the legal theory embodied in the Constitution is built “on 
the norms of virtue”); see also Yen, supra note 24, at 522–29 (tracing the development of 
copyright law from Roman times to the present day). 
92 THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 1, 2 (U.S. 1776). 
93 U.S. CONST. pmbl. 
94 The framers’ certain familiarity with Great Britain’s Statute of Anne—perhaps the 
world’s first piece of copyright legislation—suggests that the choice to forego the need 
for legislation and instead embed copyright protection into the government’s bedrock was 
a deliberate one. See Yen, supra note 24, at 527–29 (discussing the impact of the Statute of 
Anne on early American copyright theory). 
95 See generally WILTSHIRE, supra note 54. 
96 Id. at 184 (“When traced to their earliest origins, the [ideas and practices that 
formed the Bill of Rights] represent the yearnings of people over a period of two and a half 
millennia for better ways of living together and for civic arrangements that bring those 
hopes to reality . . . . It was belief in natural law that undergirded the claims of the framers 
to the rights articulated in the first ten amendments.”). 
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their faculties, and that in its government the deli-
berative forces should prevail over the arbitrary. 
They valued liberty both as an end and as a means. 
They believed liberty to be the secret of happiness and 
courage to be the secret of liberty. They believed that 
freedom to think as you will and to speak as you 
think are means indispensable to the discovery and 
spread of political truth; that without free speech 
and assembly discussion would be futile; that with 
them, discussion affords ordinarily adequate protec-
tion against the dissemination of noxious doctrine; 
that the greatest menace to freedom is an inert 
people; that public discussion is a political duty; and 
that this should be a fundamental principle of the 
American government.97 
The Copyright Clause, as an indispensable element of the Con-
stitution, is therefore best understood not as a means for the ad-
vancement of human knowledge alone, but as a means for building 
a government that can continue to improve the human condition. 
B. The Harmony of Positive and Natural Law 
The idea that federal copyright law is only meant to incentivize 
authors for its own sake ignores these crucial implications about 
human fulfillment and knowledge. This is not to say that there is no 
room for positivism in the law. Aristotle differentiated between 
positive law and natural law, but thought them both necessary.98 In 
his terminology, certain rules are recognized not as the ultimate 
aim of the law, but as a means for achieving it.99 These rules, which 
Aristotle called the nomoi, take the shape of positive laws that 
create the conditions for society to flourish.100 Economic incentives 
and arguments for efficiency therefore have their place in a com-
munity striving to advance human flourishing.101 It is not difficult 
                                                                                                                            
97 274 U.S. 357, 375 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring) (emphasis added). 
98 SANDEL, supra note 9, at 188; WILTSHIRE, supra note 54, at 12 (“Thus, for Aristotle, 
natural law has an existence apart from the conventional or positive laws that human 
beings enact to deal with matters of every day justice.”). 
99 Gordley, supra note 13, at 291–92. 
100 Id.; see also Cimino, supra note 88, at 288, 292. 
101 See SANDEL, supra note 9, at 188; Gordley, supra note 13, at 291–92. 
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to imagine that the best way to achieve a given institution’s telos is 
sometimes met through ideals of efficiency. The mistake is in 
thinking that efficiency is the only means by which to govern. 
The beauty of an Aristotelian view of copyright law is that it not 
only incorporates positivism, but also some of the more consistent 
aspects of traditional copyright naturalism. For example, Aris-
totle’s proportional distribution of goods according to what indi-
viduals deserve coincides with Locke’s labor theory, by which indi-
viduals acquire property rights according to the effort—the contri-
butions—they put into developing valuable social resources.102 By 
harmonizing the positive and natural law as Aristotle does, one can 
properly understand copyright as an articulation of natural prin-
ciples (the advancement of knowledge for the sake of human flou-
rishing) to be carried out by positive law (through, for example, the 
Copyright Act and the judicial decisions that interpret it).103 A 
means for the practice of virtuous thought, copyright is meant to 
serve as a guidepost on the path to social wisdom, enabling people 
to engage with one another intellectually in order to recognize and 
remedy unjust laws and cultural norms.104 The next section of this 
Note considers how best to understand this harmony of natural and 
positive law and put it into practice. 
C. Copyright Protection as a Means Toward an End 
Understanding copyright law as a harmony of natural and posi-
tive law only takes the argument so far. To understand how it is 
meant to promote human flourishing, it is necessary to first consid-
er what copyright law is meant to protect. The Constitution’s ref-
erence to “writings” has largely been understood to mean that 
copyright protects original artistic expression in a multitude of 
                                                                                                                            
102 See King, supra note 15, at 286 (“Differential treatment of similarly situated 
individuals is justifiable when the individuals deserve to be treated differently.”). 
103 WILTSHIRE, supra note 54, at 184 (“For individuals to live together happily in 
communities requires a compromise between freedom and order. The Bill of Rights 
achieved this balance because of the two intellectual traditions that combined to give it 
birth: the natural law tradition, with its earliest origins among the Greeks, and the positive 
rule of law that is the gift of Rome.”); see also Yen supra note 24, at 528 (concluding that 
copyright developed as a combination of natural law and economic principles). 
104 Leval, supra note 17, at 1109 (“The copyright law embodies a recognition that 
creative intellectual activity is vital to the well-being of society.”). 
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forms.105 Original expression in the case of a novel, for example, 
entails more than mere words on a page. Thus, the copyright in Al-
bert Camus’ The Stranger protects the physical copy of the book or 
the arrangement of words.106 However, copyright ought to be seen 
as also protecting the idea for which the book stands—the dangers 
of apathy, perhaps—in exactly the way that Camus chose to ex-
press that idea.107 
Copyright should be understood as protection not just for the 
physical expression but for the idea embodied in that particular ex-
pression.108 Such protection has limits,109 but the point is that only 
with such an understanding can the American copyright system 
promote the advancement of knowledge, as the framers intended. 
It is a purely practical matter: In order for an expressive work to 
contribute to social discourse, the idea’s embodiment must be 
identified and protected. Commentary on, criticism for, and educa-
tion of that idea is essential for the development of human under-
standing.110 However, such commentary and criticism is only effec-
tive when that which is commented on is first clearly articulated 
and understood. Only then can those ideas be acted upon, mod-
ified, and enacted. 
This explains why the United States has begun to recognize 
rights of integrity in copyrighted works that other countries have 
recognized for years. Copyright’s protection of more than the 
words on a page, for example, is a relatively new concept in U.S. 
                                                                                                                            
105 See, e.g., Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co. v. Sarony, 111 U.S. 53, 58 (1884) 
(concluding that Congress has understood the copyright clause to grant protection for 
“the ideas in the mind of the author [which] are given visible expression”). 
106 See generally ALBERT CAMUS, THE STRANGER (Matthew Ward trans., Vintage Books 
1989). 
107 Michael B. Reddy, The Droit de Suite: Why American Fine Artists Should Have the 
Right to a Resale Royalty, 15 LOY. L.A. ENT. L.J. 509, 517–18 (1995) (“An original [work] is 
generally viewed as ‘the one and only perfect embodiment of that work which cannot be 
matched even by the best reproduction’ and thus is the only source of ‘complete artistic 
enjoyment.”). 
108 Id. at 513 (pointing out that French courts, which borrow from similar natural law 
foundations in their own copyright jurisprudence, do not think of a work of art as simply 
an object, but as “an embodiment of its creator’s thoughts and personality”). 
109 See infra Section IV.E. 
110 Leval, supra note 17, at 1109 (“Monopoly protection of intellectual property that 
impeded referential analysis and the development of new ideas out of old would strangle 
the creative process.”). 
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copyright jurisprudence. However, it is central to copyright sys-
tems throughout Europe.111 Article 6bis of the Berne Convention, 
ratified by most of Europe and the United States,112 provides pro-
tection to authors for the ideas embodied in their expressive works 
even after the copyright for those works has been transferred to 
another.113 The United States ratified the Berne Convention in 
1988114 and, two years later, passed VARA, giving visual artists, 
among other things, the right to prevent any “distortion, mutila-
tion, or modification” of their work.115 Although the mechanism of 
VARA functions by focusing on the author’s “honor or reputa-
tion,” the right of integrity nevertheless provides the means by 
which the copyright system protects the ideas embodied in creative 
works for the sake of human flourishing.116 Much like Aristotle ar-
gued that giving individuals a personal stake in the common good 
ensures proper care for the goods of the world,117 the right of inte-
grity carries the heart of copyright law in that it gives authors a per-
sonal stake in the dissemination and discussion of new ideas. Just as 
only the best flute players fulfill the purpose of the best flutes, the 
authors of original works are the best individuals to care for their 
works in ways that fulfill the purpose of greater collective under-
standing. 
Some critics argue that intellectual property rights are not 
property rights at all.118 The distinction is largely semantic, but it is 
                                                                                                                            
111 JULIE E. COHEN ET AL., COPYRIGHT IN A GLOBAL INFORMATION ECONOMY 449 (4th 
ed. 2015) (stating that moral rights are a “central and distinguishing feature of the 
continental European copyright tradition”). 
112 Reddy, supra note 107, at 519. 
113 Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works art. 6bis, Sept. 9, 
1886, revised at Paris July 24, 1971, 25 U.S.T. 1341, 828 U.N.T.S. 221 [hereinafter Berne 
Convention] (“Independently of the author’s economic rights, and even after the transfer 
of the said rights, the author shall have the right to claim authorship of the work and to 
object to any distortion, mutilation or other modification of, or other derogatory action in 
relation to, the said work, which would be prejudicial to his honor or reputation.”). 
114 Berne Convention Implementation Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-568, 102 Stat. 2853 
(1988). 
115 Visual Artists Rights Act of 1990 § 603, 17 U.S.C. § 106A (2012). 
116 See id. 
117 See supra Section II.B. 
118 See, e.g., PATRY, supra note 4, § 1:1 (“Copyright in the United States is not a 
property right, much less a natural right. Instead, it is a statutory tort, created by positive 
law for utilitarian purposes: to promote the progress of science.”). 
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worth noting that a right is a property right in so much as it is rela-
tional and exclusive: relational in that it dictates how individuals 
interact with one another,119 and exclusive in that all property 
rights can be summarized simply as a right to exclude.120 To illu-
strate the latter, the most commonly sought after remedy in copy-
right litigation is an injunction, which, in the realm of intangible 
property, is rightly akin to a prohibition against trespass.121 
Whether it is called a property right or not, giving artists a per-
sonal stake in the advancement of knowledge is rightly viewed as an 
incentive to contribute. Lockeans are therefore wrong to entirely 
dismiss the incentive argument. The key difference between this 
approach and the utilitarian approach is that the latter treats incen-
tivization as both the means and the end of the copyright regime.122 
Utilitarians often ignore the existence of moral rights, such as the 
right of integrity, in their claims for expedience and efficiency (but 
never in their arguments for justice as an end of its own).123 As 
Sandel explains, Aristotle’s conclusion that the best flute players 
ought to play the best flutes goes beyond purely utilitarian perspec-
                                                                                                                            
119 See Cunningham, supra note 36, at 4–5 (describing property rights as “a cluster of 
background rules that determine what resources each of us has when we come into 
relations with others and, no less important, what ‘having’ or ‘lacking’ a resource entails 
in our relations with these others” (internal citations omitted)). 
120 See generally Rich, supra note 83. See also Adam Mossoff, Is Copyright Property? 42 
SAN DIEGO L. REV. 29, 41–42 (2005) (“In the context of tangible property rights, the 
courts have never demanded that a person be deprived physically of his property as a 
necessary prerequisite for finding a violation of property rights . . . it is sufficient that one 
lose the ability to use, control or dispose of the values that one has created. It is this 
concept of property that explains why copyright is in fact property, rather than monopoly 
privileges meted out to authors at the leisure of the state’s utility calculation.”). 
121 See Paul Edward Geller, Hiroshige vs. Van Gogh: Resolving the Dilemma of Copyright 
Scope in Remedying Infringement, 46 J. COPYRIGHT SOC’Y U.S.A. 39, 59 (1998) 
(differentiating between property remedies and liability remedies in copyright law). 
122 See PATRY, supra note 4, § 1:1. 
123 For example, William Patry argues in his introduction to the philosophical 
underpinnings of copyright that copyright is not a natural right but a tort created by 
statute. Id. Nowhere in his argument does Patry ask whether creating a statutory right is 
the right thing to do. See also Gordley, supra note 13, at 5; Yen, supra note 24, at 520 
(“[C]opyright protects works whose creation does not depend on the economic incentive 
of copyright. In fact, courts frequently decide controversial copyright cases with no 
explicit consideration of the economic consequences. This implies that something besides 
economics influences copyright decisions.”). 
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tives, though it acknowledges their importance.124 Similarly, the 
distribution of exclusive rights under the copyright regime must 
come from the purpose of the law to bring about justice. Only then 
is it possible to discuss efficiency: In this case, that means any in-
centive created by the copyright regime is only a means by which 
society encourages authors to create and share their works for the 
advancement of knowledge, which ultimately allows for human 
flourishing. 
To many utilitarians, copyright is law only because it is recog-
nized as such.125 An Aristotelian natural law perspective, on the 
other hand, allows for positive instruments, while also accounting 
for the need to promote society’s knowledge in the natural order of 
the world. In the words of James Madison: “The copy right [sic] of 
authors has been solemnly adjudged, in Great Britain, to be a right 
at common law . . . . The public good fully coincides . . . with the 
claims of individuals.”126 Courts are not tasked with balancing pri-
vate interests against public benefit, as some suggest.127 Rather, 
copyright law facilitates the perfect and natural combination of 
both single-handedly. 
IV. CORE COPYRIGHT CONCEPTS 
A. Originality, Ideas, and Expression 
As discussed in Part I, a Lockean account of natural law cannot 
account for some of the most fundamental aspects of modern 
American copyright law, including the originality requirement and 
the idea/expression dichotomy. Because the teleological approach 
is not dependent on labor, there is no conflict in refusing to grant 
copyright protection to authors of unoriginal works even when they 
have invested significant labor into them. Society has no need for 
                                                                                                                            
124 SANDEL, supra note 9, at 188 (“But [it is] important to see that Aristotle’s reason 
goes beyond this utilitarian consideration.”). 
125 See, e.g., PATRY, supra note 4, § 1:1 (arguing that copyright is a “statutory tort, 
created by positive law”). 
126 THE FEDERALIST NO. 43, at 288 (James Madison) (Jacob E. Cooke ed. 1961). 
127 See, e.g., Lenz v. Universal Music Corp., 801 F.3d 1126, 1138 (9th Cir. 2015), 
amended by 815 F.3d 1145 (9th Cir. 2016), cert. denied, 137 S. Ct. 416 (2016); Leval, supra 
note 17, at 1127. 
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unoriginal works in its pursuit of knowledge.128 They deserve no 
protection, as they contribute nothing to intellectual enrichment.129 
Therefore, there is no reason to give authors a personal stake in 
ideas already understood and articulated, and every reason to hold 
others liable when they falsely claim to be the guardians of an idea 
advanced by another. In a society where resources are distributed 
according to what each individual deserves, she who contributes 
nothing to the ultimate goal of copyright protection receives none. 
B. Fair Use 
Contemporary fair use jurisprudence provides the best example 
of how a teleological understanding of copyright promotes the 
progress of knowledge.130 In fact, fair use is so crucial to the fulfill-
ment of copyright’s purpose that some courts have recognized that 
the fair use of another’s copyrighted work is not merely a defense 
to copyright infringement, but a right inherent in the Copyright 
Act.131 The doctrine is outlined in section 107 of the Copyright Act, 
which specifies that “the fair use of a copyrighted work . . . is not 
an infringement of copyright.”132 The section also states that a use 
is generally fair when it is made “for purposes such as criticism, 
comment, news reporting, teaching . . . ,  scholarship, or re-
search,”133 all of which contribute greatly to social discourse aimed 
at increasing collective knowledge. 
The issue for fair users, of course, is determining whether the 
new work builds upon the idea embodied in the original work such 
                                                                                                                            
128 See Geller, supra note 121, at 64 (arguing that “[rote] copies feed nothing into 
communication networks”). 
129 See Leval, supra note 17, at 1111 (arguing that a work that “merely repackages or 
republishes” is unlikely to serve copyright’s goal of promoting the progress of science). 
130 See id. at 1110 (describing the fair use doctrine as a “necessary part of the overall 
design” of copyright). 
131 Lenz, 801 F.3d at 1133 (“Fair use is therefore distinct from affirmative defenses 
where a use infringes a copyright, but there is no liability due to a valid excuse . . . .”); 
Bateman v. Mnemonics, Inc., 79 F.3d 1532, 1542 n.22 (11th Cir. 1996) (arguing that fair 
use is better viewed not as an excused infringement, but as a right granted by the 
Copyright Act). 
132 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2012). The Ninth Circuit has gone even further to say that the 
ability to make a fair use of another’s work is an independent right of the user. See Lenz, 
801 F.3d at 1133. 
133 § 107. 
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that it stands as a separate and original work expressing its own 
idea.134 Judge Pierre Leval famously identified this so-called “trans-
formative” tenet of fair use analysis as one that speaks directly to 
the purpose-driven approach to copyright.135 Although the Copy-
right Act provides a four-factor test to assist in the determination 
of whether a use is fair,136 the Supreme Court reinforced the impor-
tance of transformativeness in Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 
where it stated that “the goal of copyright, to promote science and 
the arts, is generally furthered by the creation of transformative 
works.”137 
Consider again Cariou v. Prince.138 Richard Prince, an appropri-
ation artist,139 reused several of Patrick Cariou’s photographs taken 
over the course of six years that Cariou spent living with Rastafa-
rians in Jamaica.140 After making very slight alterations, Prince pub-
lished them under his own name in New York art galleries.141 In 
some instances, the court said, “Prince did little more than paint 
blue lozenges over the subject’s eyes and mouth, and paste a pic-
ture of a guitar over the subject’s body.”142 Nevertheless, the 
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit concluded that twenty-five 
of the thirty photos Prince appropriated were taken fairly.143 
This decision cannot sit well with Lockeans who, with their re-
liance on labor, no doubt feel as if Cariou—who spent six years liv-
                                                                                                                            
134 Leval, supra note 17, at 1110 (“Briefly stated, the use must be of a character that 
serves the copyright objective of stimulating productive thought and public instruction 
without excessively diminishing the incentives for creativity.”). 
135 Although Judge Leval took a utilitarian perspective on this purpose, his view, as well 
as the view of other utilitarians, can be reconciled with the hybrid natural law approach 
presented here where the goal of copyright conditions society to achieve the higher order, 
naturalistic goal of human flourishing. See supra Part III. 
136 § 107. 
137 510 U.S. 569, 579 (1994). 
138 714 F.3d 694 (2d Cir. 2013). 
139 Appropriation art is “the practice of artists taking already existing objects and using 
them, with little alteration, in their own works.” Hannah Jane Parkinson, Instagram, an 
Artist and the $100,000 Selfies—Appropriation in the Digital Age, GUARDIAN (July 18, 2015, 
5:00 AM), https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2015/jul/18/instagram-artist-
richard-prince-selfies [https://perma.cc/F5RE-NRW4]. 
140 Cariou, 714 F.3d at 698. 
141 Id. 
142 Id. at 701. 
143 Id. at 698. 
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ing in Jamaica for the sake of his photography—unfairly lost out to 
another artist with more notoriety who added a modicum of paint 
to Cariou’s photographs.144 By severing the reliance on labor and 
focusing on the true purpose of copyright to promote the progress 
of knowledge, however, one can come to terms with the Second 
Circuit’s conclusion: “Here, looking at the artworks and the pho-
tographs side-by-side, we conclude that Prince’s images, except for 
those we discuss separately below, have a different character, give 
Cariou’s photographs a new expression, and employ new aesthetics 
with creative and communicative results distinct from Ca-
riou’s.”145 Assuming that the Second Circuit was correct in its be-
lief that Prince’s works contributed new ideas to the information 
marketplace, the court was right to find his use fair.146 
The case of Sega Enterprises Ltd. v. Accolade, Inc. also illustrates 
how copyright law, through the fair use doctrine, serves to enhance 
collective knowledge.147 There, the Ninth Circuit allowed a video 
game competitor to copy computer software in order to develop an 
industry standard.148 Combined with the fact that the Ninth Circuit 
has recognized fair use as a distinct right in the Copyright Act, Sega 
demonstrates how American copyright law grants a right of fair use 
just as much as it grants the right to exclude—both for the sake of 
intellectual enrichment. 
C. The First Sale Doctrine 
The first sale doctrine, which the Supreme Court recently dis-
cussed in Kirtsaeng v. John Wiley & Sons, Inc.,149 is also compatible 
with the teleological approach to copyright. After Supap Kirtsaeng 
                                                                                                                            
144 See id. at 706 (“Where Cariou’s serene and deliberately composed portraits and 
landscape photographs depict the natural beauty of Rastafarians and their surrounding 
environs, Prince’s crude and jarring works, on the other hand, are hectic and 
provocative.”). 
145 Id. at 707–08. 
146 Prince has since taken his art steps closer toward unfair use on the back of his 
courtroom success. A recent gallery show portrayed Instagram photos taken by other 
photographers. This time, Prince’s only contributions were “esoteric, lewd, emoji-
annotated comments made beneath the pictures.” Prince sold some of these photos for 
up to $100,000. Parkinson, supra note 139. 
147 977 F.2d 1510 (9th Cir. 1992). 
148 See id. at 1518; see also Geller, supra note 121, at 62. 
149 133 S. Ct. 1351 (2013). 
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came to study at a U.S. university and encountered the exorbitantly 
high price of college textbooks, he began selling copies of textbooks 
purchased by his family at his hometown bookstore in Thailand.150 
Because the books were considerably cheaper in Thailand than in 
the United States, he captured the opportunity to make a signifi-
cant profit by reselling them in the United States at a considerable 
discount, as compared to other retailers.151 When the publishing 
companies got wind of this, they brought a lawsuit against Kirt-
saeng, alleging infringement of their distribution right.152 Kirt-
saeng’s success in the case may be surprising, especially to utilita-
rians who rely so heavily on economic incentives as the only ratio-
nale underlying copyright. His victory may also unnerve Lockeans 
because the publishing company no doubt made larger investments 
(labor) in the sale of their textbooks than Kirtsaeng did. 
Though it may not adequately capture either the utilitarian or 
Lockean philosophy, the Supreme Court’s decision is perfectly 
aligned with a teleological perspective. The first sale doctrine, as 
articulated in the Copyright Act, provides that the owner of a par-
ticular copy of a copyrighted work is permitted to sell that copy 
even without permission from the copyright owner.153 Although the 
question presented before the Supreme Court focused on whether 
the words “lawfully made under this title” place a geographical 
restriction on the first sale doctrine,154 the Court emphasized that 
such a restriction cannot comport with the American copyright sys-
tem and its aim to facilitate the advancement of knowledge.155 Li-
braries, universities, art galleries, and other artistic and educational 
institutions rely heavily on the doctrine for the continued operation 
of their businesses.156 Beyond mere practicality, though, such a re-
striction is unnecessary to protect the ideas embodied in text-
                                                                                                                            
150 Id. at 1356. 
151 Id. 
152 Id. at 1357. 
153 17 U.S.C. § 109(a) (2012). 
154 Kirtsaeng, 133 S. Ct. at 1357. 
155 Id. at 1364–67; see also id. at 1358 (“We also doubt that Congress would have 
intended to create the practical copyright-related harms with which a geographical 
interpretation would threaten ordinary scholarly, artistic, commercial, and consumer 
activities.”). 
156 Id. at 1364, 1366. 
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books.157 By contrast, a decision based exclusively on economics 
would likely have been in favor of the publishing company, though 
such a conclusion would have entirely evaded the purpose of 
American copyright law. After all, the publishing company still re-
tains a personal stake in curating the knowledge found within its 
printed pages. Furthermore, Kirtsaeng’s conduct facilitated the 
purpose of copyright by allowing for easier and cheaper access to 
valuable information.158 The only burden an unrestricted first sale 
bestows on a publisher is a forced reevaluation of its competitive 
edge in today’s information economy.159 Unlike the utilitarian and 
Lockean theories, a teleological account of copyright law presents 
little or no conflict with the modern application of the first sale 
doctrine. 
D. Transfers of Ownership 
The information economy puts special importance on under-
standing copyright ownership.160 Reconciling the transfer of a given 
copyright with a teleological perspective is potentially problemat-
ic.161 This Note suggests that private property rights are justified by 
the need to protect ideas embodied in artistic expression, and that 
such protection is best provided by granting said property rights to 
the originator of that expression. How then can an original author 
assign her copyright to another person or company and still fulfill 
her responsibilities as the guardian of the idea embodied in her 
work? 
                                                                                                                            
157 Admittedly, the final outcome for Kirtsaeng has yet to be decided. The Supreme 
Court’s decision allows Kirtsaeng to invoke the defense that was denied by the district 
court. It has since been remanded to the district court. See John Wiley & Sons, Inc. v. 
Kirtsaeng, 713 F.3d 1142 (2013). 
158 Kirtsaeng, 133 S. Ct. at 1364–67 (discussing how a decision against Kirtsaeng would 
severely impact the practices of libraries, bookkeepers, museums, and other information 
retailers). 
159 See id. at 1365–66 (explaining how fair trade is fundamental to the copyright regime). 
160 See PEÑALVER & KATYAL, supra note 5, at 27 (“Accordingly, property rights and the 
social norms that accompany (and are often reinforced by) ownership play a vital role in 
ordering our interactions with other human beings.”). 
161 See id. at 29 (“As Abraham Bell and Gideon Parchomovsky have argued, ‘the 
institution of property is designed to create and defend the value that inheres in stable 
ownership.’” (quoting Abraham Bell & Gideon Parchomovsky, A Theory of Property, 90 
CORNELL L. REV. 531, 551 (2005))). 
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One potential explanation can be found in moral rights. The 
Berne Convention recognizes, as other countries do, that copyright 
ought to protect more than the rights of reproduction, distribution, 
publication, and others listed in the Copyright Act.162 In-
stead, copyright ought to protect the “integrity” of the work, 
which, as discussed, is where the idea embodied in the expression 
truly lies.163 The answer for the Berne Convention, then, lies in the 
fact that the right of integrity cannot be assigned, waived, or oth-
erwise transferred, even if the author’s other “economic” rights 
have been.164 Though the United States did not initially buy into 
this facet of the Berne Convention, it later embraced it—albeit li-
mitedly—when Congress passed VARA.165 Like the Berne Con-
vention, VARA specifies that certain authors shall have rights of 
attribution and integrity for their entire lives,166 regardless of 
whether or not the other exclusive rights or copies of the works 
have been transferred,167 though they can be waived.168 
The distinction between the moral rights delineated in VARA 
and the six exclusive rights provided by the Copyright Act is in-
structive.169 The former protects the work’s integrity—the heart of 
the idea embodied in the expression170—and the latter protects 
matters that are arguably ancillary, such as the right to control how, 
when, and if reproductions are made, distributed, modified, and so 
on.171 Decisions about these issues are without a doubt important 
for protecting the work and its idea, but they can be made by any-
one. Decisions about a work’s integrity, however, can only be made 
by the original author. The “economic” rights are less, in a word, 
integral to the overall purpose of copyright law and its aim to pro-
mote the progress of knowledge, which is perhaps why VARA re-
                                                                                                                            
162 See supra Section III.B. 
163 See Reddy, supra note 107, at 514 (noting that the right of integrity is considered by 
many to be the most important moral right). 
164 Berne Convention, supra note 113, at art. 6bis. 
165 King, supra note 15, at 267–68 (noting that when the United States finally ratified the 
Berne Convention, it did not recognize moral rights). 
166 17 U.S.C. § 106A(d) (2012). 
167 § 106A(e)(2). 
168 § 106A(e)(1) 
169 Compare 17 U.S.C. § 106 (2012), with § 106A. 
170 See § 106A. 
171 See § 106. 
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cognizes that moral rights are “independent” from the exclusive 
rights of the Copyright Act.172 So long as authors retain the right to 
protect the work’s integrity, they ought to be free to assign their 
other rights to whomever they choose under a teleological frame-
work.173 
A transfer of copyright can therefore be consistent with the te-
leological view: Original creators would remain the guardians of the 
original ideas embodied in their work even after relinquishing their 
exclusive rights granted by the Copyright Act.174 However, VARA 
only applies to certain artists—namely, those that create works of 
the visual arts.175 Such an extreme limitation is curious, especially 
considering that the Berne Convention made no such restriction.176 
The United States ought to expand its protection of moral rights to 
reflect that of the Berne Convention, not just for the sake of fa-
shioning a teleological justification of copyright, but simply because 
authors of literary works, works of the performing arts, and musical 
works, to name a few, also have an interest in protecting the integr-
ity of their work.177 Given their meaningful contributions to social 
education and understanding, there is no reason not to. 
E. The Public Domain 
The growth of the online information economy has put new 
pressure on copyright laws. Advocates for a rich public domain ar-
gue that information, knowledge, and culture are locked up by the 
existence and expansion of copyright and other intellectual proper-
ty laws.178 Proponents of the “copyleft” movement argue for the 
                                                                                                                            
172 § 106A(a). 
173 See Reddy, supra note 107, at 514 (noting that “[i]n most nations utilizing this 
copyright system, artists can never transfer all of their interests in a given work”). 
174 See Wong, supra note 5, at 814 (“[R]estrictions on an author’s exclusive rights are 
permissible so long as they do not encroach on the personal link between the author, her 
creation and the necessary exploitation of such creations which assure that author’s 
ability to lead an autonomous life . . . .”) 
175 § 106A(b). 
176 Article 2 of the Berne Convention protects “literary and artistic works,” which 
includes “every production in the literary, scientific and artistic domain, whatever may be 
the mode or form of its expression . . . .” Berne Convention, supra note 113, at art. 2. 
177 See generally ROBERTA ROSENTHAL KWALL, THE SOUL OF CREATIVITY: FORGING A 
MORAL RIGHTS LAW FOR THE UNITED STATES (2009). 
178 See Cunningham, supra note 36, at 6. 
642          FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. [Vol. XXVII:613 
 
total abolishment of the copyright regime on the ground that priva-
tization effectuated by these exclusive rights prohibits certain indi-
viduals from participating in civil discourse.179 Even under a utilita-
rian or Lockean theory, these “leftists” are mistaken. But they are 
especially incorrect under a teleological perspective. 
Copyright laws do not lock up information; to the contrary, 
they set it free.180 The whole purpose of copyright law, as discussed 
in this Note, is to promote the advancement of knowledge. What 
good would the system be if it locked up information? If there was 
any credible evidence suggesting that the progress of knowledge 
has somehow been impeded by the system designed to facilitate it, 
the system would have been abandoned long ago. But technological 
innovation and scientific understanding have grown exponentially 
over the last two hundred years—a period that coincides with the 
history of expansion of copyright and other intellectual property 
laws. 
More importantly, leftists fail to recognize two important 
things. First, the protection of public domain materials is literally 
written into American copyright laws in several ways: fair use, the 
first sale doctrine, originality requirements, the idea/expression 
dichotomy, and term limits, among others.181 These and other re-
strictions on the Copyright Act’s exclusive rights facilitate civic 
discourse for the general advancement of social understanding.182 
Second, although the law recognizes, just as Aristotle did, that so-
ciety benefits from granting property rights to those individuals 
who will cultivate the goods over which they exercise dominion, 
the law also recognizes that there is no point in granting such ex-
                                                                                                                            
179 See PEÑALVER & KATYAL, supra note 5, at 27 (“The isolating and disabling effects of 
exclusion from participation in a property system, however, mean that those on the outside 
looking in will often have few means to communicate their dissent beyond the simple act 
of taking or occupying.”). 
180 See Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 545–46 (1985) 
(“[C]opyright is intended to increase and not to impede the harvest of knowledge . . . . 
The rights conferred by copyright are designed to assure contributors to the store of 
knowledge a fair return for their labors.”). 
181 See 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2012) (fair use); id. § 109 (first sale doctrine); id. § 102 
(originality requirement and idea/expression dichotomy); id. §§ 301–305 (copyright 
duration). 
182 See Neil Weinstock Netanel, Copyright and a Democratic Civil Society, 106 YALE L.J. 
283, 288 (1996). 
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clusive rights if the social benefits are never realized. In the tradi-
tional sense, such goods were land and the natural world; today 
these goods are information commodities. 
The movement for a complete public domain can be generally 
summarized as a refusal to pay for information that individuals 
consume. Leftists cannot reconcile the thought of information 
packaged and sold with their desire for an information utopia. The 
solution for them, then, lies not in abolishing copyright law, but in 
changing the way individuals think about and share information 
with the community. Perhaps information should be entirely free. 
But at what cost to its quality and availability? 
CONCLUSION 
Whether a grand unifying theory of copyright is truly possible is 
admittedly questionable.183 However, rebuilding copyright from the 
ground up with a teleological approach is not only consistent with 
the core principles that make up the majority of the regime’s en-
forcement, it can also shed light on crucial questions that continue 
to arise as society becomes more and more technologically depen-
dent. Much more needs to be discussed, including: (1) whether the 
inheritance of copyright by an original author’s heir comports with 
the purpose of copyright,184 (2) whether software and other com-
puter programs are best served by the copyright system or perhaps 
better by the patent system,185 (3) whether and, if so, how copy-
right claims should be used to thwart competition,186 and (4) the 
role intermediaries (such as online service providers) should play in 
protecting the copyright of others.187 
                                                                                                                            
183 See PATRY, supra note 4, § 1:1. 
184 See generally Tonya M. Evans, Statutory Heirs Apparent?: Reclaiming Copyright in the 
Age of Author-Controlled, Author-Bnefitting Transfers, 119 W. VA. L. REV. 297 (2016). 
185 See generally Dennis S. Karjala, The Relative Roles of Patent and Copyright in the 
Protection of Computer Programs, 17 J. MARSHALL J. COMPUTER & INFO. L. 41 (1998). 
186 See generally Sara K. Stadler, Copyright as Trade Regulation, 155 U. PA. L. REV. 899 
(2007). 
187 For a discussion of this issue, see Joel R. Reidenberg, The Rule of Intellectual Property 
Law in the Internet Economy, 44 HOUS. L. REV. 1073, 1076 (2007), who wrote: “By defining 
the rules of access to and control of information, intellectual property rights create the 
demarcation lines in a networked society of economic, political, and social interactions.” 
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For now, it is enough to remember that the protection copy-
right provides not only gives owners their due but also facilitates a 
system for continuing greater social understanding and flourishing. 
That is, after all, what the artistic works protected by copyright ul-
timately aim to do. It is about time the law comes around to fulfil-
ling that end. 
